Fisheries in New Zealand:
The Maori and the Quota Management System

Prepared For:
The First Nation Panel on Fisheries
March 2004

By: Andrew Day
Fisheries in New Zealand: The Maori and the Quota Management System

Introduction

New Zealand’s Quota Management System (QMS) was put forth in the early eighties as a strategy designed to meet demands for economic and managerial efficiency as well as reduce overfishing. While not the first country to bring in quotas, New Zealand was the first to adopt them on such a broad scale. But the introduction of the QMS in 1986 coincided with the growth of a legal and political struggle by the Maori peoples to gain recognition for their rights to access and manage fisheries. As might be expected, a showdown developed. It became obvious that the QMS could not succeed without addressing Maori interests.

While the QMS fueled divisions, it also provided incentives for settling differences quickly. Further, quotas provided a common economic “currency” to begin settling Maori commercial claims. After litigation, negotiation, and interim legislation, a settlement was reached in 1992. During this time, Maori commercial claims were supported by constitutional provisions to address customary fishing rights (similar to food, social, and ceremonial rights in BC).

What has evolved is an on-going effort to reconcile a system of individual transferable quotas (ITQ’s) and state-run fisheries management with Maori traditions and aspirations. This attempted reconciliation has raised interesting issues about how the Maori relate to other New Zealanders, to each other, and to their past, present, and future. It is of special relevance to current fisheries issues in British Columbia, where there are important parallels.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT: MAORI INTERESTS AND THE NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENT

English settlement in New Zealand occurred around 1840. The Treaty of Waitangi was signed, guaranteeing Maori “full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their fisheries.” For the next forty or so years, fisheries were largely considered ‘open access’ with little colonial government management. When shellfish resources started to show signs of strain, the government passed its first set of fishing regulations. These regulations were followed by the Oyster Fisheries Act, which separated customary Maori fisheries from commercial fisheries. This was the beginning of a series of legislation and policies that restricted Maori access and management.

Under pressure, policies and programs to assimilate into colonial New Zealand culture, by 1960 40% of Maori were living in urban areas. Traditional tribal structures were struggling for survival. But the 1960s and early 1970s brought renewed interest in indigenous cultures and increased sympathy for those trying to preserve traditional Maori culture and practices. A rejuvenated Maori movement including different tribes working together, and a political swing to the left in New Zealand politics, led to the creation of the Waitangi
Tribunal in 1975. The Tribunal was established to address Māori interests and claims regarding the practical application of the Treaty of Waitangi.

The 1970s also saw the creation and extension of the exclusive economic zone, giving New Zealand exclusive access to 4.8 million square kilometres of ocean. This was a significant turning point in New Zealand's previously marginal fishing industry, giving rise to significant commercial fisheries potential. A Fisheries Act was passed in 1983 to help address the growing industry. It acknowledged Māori fishing rights, but did little to implement them.

The Māori were increasingly turning to the courts to address their interests and claims. Their concern for the environment was interwoven with their claims, giving them a strong ‘moral high ground’ and winning them considerable public support. A landmark case in 1984 significantly advanced their attempts to win back lost access to fisheries, and signaled that Māori interests could no longer be treated in a token manner. This occurred at the same time as fishing industry representatives and government officials began to push for the introduction of individual transferable quotas (ITQs). While the main stated objectives of an ITQ system were to address overfishing and improve administrative and economic efficiency, part of the impetus behind individual transferable quotas was to create an easily quantifiable right that would have to be ‘bought back’ should the Māori become more successful in their claims.

In 1985 the New Zealand government widened the Waitangi Tribunal’s mandate to include claims prior to 1975. The heating up of Māori claims and litigation was accompanied by a heating up of the push for individual transferable quotas, and in 1986 the government introduced a Quota Management System (QMS). The system covered 29 species comprising more than 80% of the total catch in all fisheries.

**THE QMS: INTRODUCTION, REACTION, and ACTION**

The Quota Management System garnered international attention as an innovative model to manage New Zealand’s developing fishing industry. But promises of economically efficient management were immediately challenged by the increasingly heated debate over original fishing rights. The Waitangi Tribunal recommended that the QMS system be halted until after negotiations with affected tribes. Numerous Māori tribes joined together and filed an injunction to stop further development of the QMS. The project was stopped in its tracks in 1987 by a High Court injunction preventing the issuance of quotas for one year in an attempt to settle disputed claims.

Faced with the uncertainty of endless court battles and public support (particularly for the environmentalist aspect of the Māori struggle), the state established a Joint Working Group with Māori and government appointments to resolve fishing rights. There was little consensus, and each side ended up producing their own reports. But the push for resolution continued. More formal negotiations began between the Māori and the New Zealand government. The Māori moved from 100% to 50%, while the Crown ended up offering 100% of inshore fisheries and 12.5% of deep sea fisheries (12.5% was equivalent to Māori
percentage of the New Zealand population). Negotiations stalemated, and the QMS remained stalled.

Despite there being no settlement, the NZ government acted quickly to reallocate resources and meet Maori demands for access to the already active system. They passed the **Maori Fisheries Act** in 1989 as a means of addressing Maori interests while a settlement was negotiated. The Act created the Maori Fisheries Commission to buy back 10% of quotas already in the QMS system (2.5%/year over a four year period on a willing buyer/seller basis). The MFC would also establish the Aotearoa Fisheries Ltd company, to use 50% of the quotas and acquire further assets. The other 50% of acquired quotas were to be leased annually with preference given to Maori fishermen. Finally, the Act provided for the protection of specific areas as “sources of food for spiritual and cultural reasons.”

The Maori saw this interim settlement as unsatisfactory and continued to advance their claims in the courts, public, and political domains. Under continued pressure, the NZ government agreed not to bring further species into the QMS until a settlement was reached or court resolution. They also established a Fisheries Task Force in 1991. The Task Force concluded that QMS was not at odds with Maori fishing rights and that the QMS system could be adapted to address Maori interests. They envisaged a system comprised of Maori harvesting rights to fish in general areas not excluding others (purchased through and run as part of the QMS), but also exclusive Maori rights within small areas where only local tribes were permitted to harvest.

The Maori did not accept the Task Force’s recommendations, litigation continued, and negotiations seemed at a standstill. The stability of the QMS system was threatened by the constant uncertainty. In 1992, the fishing industry was suffering setbacks, and a major player, Sealord, went up for sale. This provided a major opportunity to further reallocate fishing resources. The Maori and NZ government negotiated for the NZ government to purchase 50% of Sealord Ltd. (at NZ$150million over three years). In addition to the 10% under the **Maori Fisheries Act**, and skilled investments by the Commission, the Maori now owned 23% of ITQs.

The energy created around the Sealord deal continued. The same year saw the passing of the **Settlement Act** guaranteeing Maori fishers 20% of quota for new species introduced into the QMS. It also included seats on fisheries statutory bodies, recognizing special relationship of Maori and the Crown, and ensured customary fishing rights. Customary fishing rights would be allocated as a priority over recreational and commercial allocations, and would be managed separately from them (regulations were developed subsequently: see Appendix C for 1996 regulations re customary fishing). The Maori, in return, would accept the settlement as full and final resolution of their claims and cease current and future legal action.

While offered as a final settlement it was not met with unanimous enthusiasm, nor did it resolve all issues. Iwi (chiefs) representing 20% of tribes did not endorse it. A central issue would be how the settlement, and previously acquired quota and assets, would be allocated between Maori tribes. A huge landmark was reached, but the road toward a final settlement continued.
AFTER THE SETTLEMENT ACT

The Settlement Act called for the reorganization and re-naming of the Maori Fisheries Commission to better facilitate the allocation process between tribes and carry out its other functions. The commission increased significantly in size (from 7 to 13 commissioners plus greatly increased staff) and budget.

The new Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission’s responsibilities were threefold: 1) to develop a plan to equitably distribute pre-settlement assets and post-settlement assets, 2) to manage assets held in trust for tribes, and finally, 3) to encourage Maori education and participation in the fishing industry.

The Commission’s work managing assets appears to have been impressive. The Commission leases quota to tribes at a discount from regular lease rates, and assists them in forming their own companies. It currently assists 60+ tribal companies. It has also continued to buy quota through its revenues, and has invested in aquaculture and processing, increasing the value of assets held in trust (from NZ$350 mil. in 1992 to NZ$700 mil. in 2002). It is currently negotiating a possible merger with Sanford, one of New Zealand’s oldest and largest fishing companies. After amalgamating all existing company shares under one group, Aotearoa Fisheries Limited (AFL) will represent the largest single fishing entity in New Zealand. In addition to aquaculture and processing interests, the Maori will own more than 33% of quota (the Maori population is approximately 15% of the total in NZ). In short, the Commission has become a dominant force in the industry.

The Commission has fulfilled its education mandate mainly through a scholarship fund, which has provided funding for numerous Maori youth, and through a training partnership with the Seafood Industry Council (SeaFIC), which had a pre-existing training program in place. The Maori have successfully sought to expand the scholarship fund and training activities to non-fishing activities.

However, achieving its allocation mandate has not been so easy. After 5 years of consultation and discussion, the Commission proposed an Optimum Method for Allocation. This included fishing quotas divided into inshore and deep water (using 300m contour as the dividing line). Inshore quotas were to be allocated based on length of coastline pertaining to the tribal area. Deep water quotas were allocated 50% based on coastline and 50% based on population (tribe as percent of total NZ population). The Commission also recommended a dispute resolution framework and standards for tribal governance structures (democratic, accountable, and transparent).

While approved by a marginal majority, the model provoked further debate, and was not adopted. If anything, it ensured the continued existence of the Commission as an umbrella organization for settling conflict and managing assets. It also undermined some public trust and support for the Maori.
After further consultations and discussion, the Commission proposed a revised allocation model in 2002—the decade after the 1992 Deed of Settlement was signed. The model is detailed in the booklet ‘He Kawai Amokura’ (see Appendix D: Fact Sheet for more details). A significant majority of iwi agreed to support the model going to Parliament, though some still opposed it. A flood of litigation arose from both Maori (including an urban Maori group) and non-Maori, though most was dismissed and none blocked the model from proceeding to Parliament. Legislation enacting the allocation of Maori fisheries assets and distribution of benefits from the deal was introduced by the NZ government in December 2003.

**ISSUES ARISING PRE and POST SETTLEMENT ACT**

An in-depth discussion of the case study presented above is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is important to summarize some of the key issues that have arisen during this story.

1. The large number of Maori living in urban areas has given rise to some tension in trying to find an allocation model. Some urban Maori claim to have different views than their tribal leaders, and claim that they are not treated equally by their tribes. By virtue of where they live, they can have different interests than Maori living in rural areas.

2. While the revival in tribal identity and Maori identity helped spur Maori claims, litigation, and negotiation towards a settlement, tribalism has also created some divisions and challenges post-settlement. With competition between tribes for shares of allocations, the Commission has found itself in the difficult position of balancing and essentially arbitrating different tribal interests—a thankless and unpopular job. It has also assisted tribes in their development while managing on their behalf, laying itself open both to allegations of paternalism, and to power plays attempting to undermine it. The tension between an overarching body such as the Commission and the autonomy of individual tribes is an on-going challenge in any governance scenario. It has been a primary cause in the lengthy allocation debates described above and was clearly a central consideration in the final 2003 allocation model.

3. The division of customary and commercial interests begun in 1892 continues, though it is not clear how substantial is this issue. Resources accessed for

---

1 The challenge has been made greater by the push towards greater power for tribes from the tribes themselves, from governments eager to offload bureaucratic responsibilities, and from the Commission fulfilling its development mandate. As one commentator states, “During the 1980s and early 1990s an explicit distinction emerged between Maori development and tribal (iwi) developments. The tribes saw themselves increasingly as the political, social, and economic form of Maori organisation and strove to have this self-perception institutionalised in government policy” (Rata 2002). While increased tribal authority has been the goal all along, the rise in “neo-tribal capitalism” (Rata 2000) accompanying the large amount of wealth being produced and distributed produces interesting dynamics. Tribal leadership has higher stakes, and corporate structures and goals mixed with governance authority can bring out intense competition and self-interest at the tribal level. As noted above, this is perhaps an unavoidable consequence of any governance system that tries to disperse power and wealth.
customary purposes are not immune to the impacts of commercial activities, and some claim that over-harvesting in the commercial realm impacts customary access. At the same time, customary access can be used as a front for illegal commercial sales if not closely managed. It is not clear whether tensions have arisen or will arise within communities between customary and commercial users.

4. Similarly, there are divisions between recreational, commercial, aquaculture, and customary users. With interests spanning all of these groups, Maori have a unique challenge and opportunity in finding ways to reconcile and harmonize often competing interests within their communities and with other communities. These kinds of issues may continue to grow as the Maori assert claims to foreshore and seabed areas.

5. The QMS system is rooted in a private-property paradigm. While advantageous at converting ecological wealth to financial wealth, the disadvantages of private-property systems largely result from their single-mindedness in pursuing efficient production. Problems can include increased consolidation, loss of employment, pressure on stocks due to overcapitalization resulting from high licence/quota costs, high monitoring and enforcement costs, and incentives to high-grade/dump. (Some of these problems can be increased when leasing becomes the norm, as fishermen become ‘renters’ and cease to have the stewardship incentives of owners). Added to these problems, there is nothing to keep transferable licences within Maori communities over time. While it is important to recognize that every system has its flaws, one commentator has said, “the fishing industry is fiercely competitive and there are no guarantees that the large number of small Maori controlled companies will survive in the longer run. If this is the case, it will be difficult to keep Maori assets together, even if limitations are placed on the transfer of shares to stop ‘cannibalisation’ of existing companies. Having accepted ITQs as the going ‘currency’, it is difficult to back track and impose severe limitations on transferability. Maori will still benefit, but more as owners of capital...than as active entrepreneurs and participants in the fishing industry” (Hersoug 2002).

6. Fisheries do not exist in a vacuum. A number of issues are impacting fisheries world-wide, and are also occurring in New Zealand. Concerns about seabird populations, marine mammal health, biosecurity (introduction of exotic species, etc.), marine pollution, habitat degredation, oil/gas/mining development of the ocean floor, and other issues are increasingly prevalent in fisheries management. By focusing so long and hard on access and allocation, these issues have perhaps not gotten the full attention they deserve. Species at risk issues, marine protected areas, and other approaches will challenge the Maori to reconcile their economic interests with their environmental interests. This problem is increased in QMS systems, where broader ecosystem interests are narrowed to property rights in one or several species. There are reports that quota-holders have tried to ‘externalize’ their impacts and have lobbied against measures to protect other species, habitat, or the broader ecosystem.
SUMMARY

The collision of QMS with the struggle over original fishing and management rights echoes a broader context of cultural difference. Traditionally, English common law focused on a ‘common property’ belief leading to a largely unregulated ‘open access’ approach to fisheries management. This belief was replaced by the dogma of state ‘command and control’ management of limited licences, and more recently the ideology of corporate privatization. The Maori belief system, on the other hand, traditionally involved a complex system of nested rights and responsibilities involving extended families, villages and tribes, specifying who could fish and when, where, and how. The system was area-based, with a strong emphasis on the connections between species, between people, and between people and their broader environment. There were elements of property-rights set in a context of responsibilities enforced by formal and informal cultural norms, beliefs, institutions, and rituals.

English settlement of New Zealand, and the Oyster Fisheries Act of 1892 marked the beginning of a change in the fishing rights and management responsibilities of the Maori. The Act was carried out under the false assumption that the dramatically increased strain on aquatic resources by English settlers could be managed separately and have little or no effect on the customary fisheries of the Maori. It created an unnatural split both between commercial and customary fisheries, and between English and Maori. These conflicting paradigms and splits continue to affect fisheries to this day.

Upon introduction, the QMS seemed likely to be yet another chapter in this divisive and conflictual history. But ironically, while the intention of the QMS system was clearly not to settle Maori claims, that is what was needed in order for QMS to work. Unlike earlier approaches to fisheries management, this time court decisions and the desire to promote a new management system led the New Zealand government to acknowledge Maori customary and commercial fishing as an integral part of fisheries. There was a recognition that QMS could not succeed unless Maori fishing rights were established. This recognition of interdependence began a process of integrating different beliefs and paradigms.

Within five years of recognizing interdependence in a meaningful way, a major settlement was reached, the Maori owned 23% of quota, and the QMS system and its participants achieved the stability they desired. The industry has grown significantly since that time, both for Maori and other participants. In effect, the introduction of QMS was a catalyst for the active settlement of claims and redistribution of the resource. Clearly some catalyst was needed to get people to realize the necessity of integrating perspectives and beliefs.

The settlement was a milestone for the Maori and the industry, but was not the end of the story. For the Maori, it was the beginning of a long, hard process of working out the details. A decade after the settlement, legislation is only now finalizing the inter-Maori allocations.

What is the end result? Whether Maori tribes, individuals, or fishermen have attained an equitable settlement is obviously a matter of perspective. Statistics show a significantly expanded fishery, from $25 million in 1976 to $1.4 Billion in 1996, with Maori interests moving from minimal commercial
involvement in the 1970s to controlling 40% of the industry in 2002. Maori have advanced scholarships and training, processing and marketing interests, and there are now Maori representatives on fishery statutory bodies and Maori appointed guardians of exclusive fishing areas.

But while there has been improvement on many fronts, the future is unclear. Especially regarding the sustainability of the fish. At least one recent report suggests that many stocks have declined considerably under the QMS system. It also states that political pressure from wealthy quota-holders has undermined the transparency and accountability of decision-making and science, and has created resistance against broader ecosystem issues. In a nutshell, the QMS system is a corporate model that may be causing fish to be ‘mined’, with the high initial proceeds invested in other ventures and in lobbying to protect short-term interests.

Other questions also need to be examined. How will tribalism work with overarching Maori coordination, and vice versa? How will exclusive customary fishing areas relate to the larger QMS system? Does the QMS system adequately reflect the traditional ecosystem approach of the Maori? Is the voice of Maori in fisheries decision making strong enough to make a difference? How will the Maori deal with the pressures inherent in an ITQ system? Can and will the fishing industry address larger environmental issues that it impacts and is impacted by? How will competition with other aquatic sectors be addressed?

Current Maori participation in commercial fishing is a long way from where they were in 1985. And a long way from where we are at in BC today. This is due to their strong legal and negotiating resistance to QMS coupled with government’s desire to implement the QMS system. It is also due to astute business development and a general increase in seafood prices and wealth in the 1990s. The future of Maori interests are uncertain as a number of questions about the impacts of the QMS system on fish, communities, and the broader ecosystem remain unanswered.

Bibliography


Appendix A: Overview of the New Zealand Fishing Industry

New Zealand's fishing industry is small but important, growing rapidly in value over the last twenty years due in part to the expansion of its fishing area but also because of the introduction of the QMS and explosive growth in world seafood trade.

It is characterized by a large number of small stocks clearly contained within national boundaries. The vast majority of its 130 commercially fished species are within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), totalling 5.6 mil. tons TAC annually. Fishing generates about 1.8% of New Zealand's GDP and 5% of total export earnings.

When first implemented in 1986, the QMS system covered 29 species comprising more than 80% of total catch in all fisheries. The QMS expanded to cover a total of 43 species or 85% of total catch by 2001. But 117 species are still managed outside the QMS. The Ministry of Fisheries (MFish) recently announced final advice on 25 new species that will be added into the QMS on 1 October 2004. The Minister's decisions establish the Quota Management Areas, fishing year and unit of measure for the expression of Total Allowable Commercial Catches and Annual Catch Entitlements.

The QMS has had an impact on the distribution of access. 80% of quotas are concentrated in 10 companies, with the three largest controlling 50% of the industry. The number of active fishing vessels has declined steadily since the introduction of the QMS.

The fishing industry is administered by the Ministry of Fisheries. The majority of staff are concentrated in the capital city, Auckland. Over half are employed in compliance, and roughly one quarter are involved in data management for the QMS. Science is mainly contracted out to the National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research. Approximately half of the ministry's budget is paid through levies and transaction charges, by the industry. After years of debate about how these levies were assessed, a recent settlement found that levies were frequently too high, returning NZ$24 million to industry and establishing a new levy system.

Aquaculture (primarily of oysters and mussels, with some salmon) has grown rapidly in the last 15 years and continues to gain in prominence. Although small, the importance of the fishing industry should not be underplayed. In many rural areas with unskilled and semi-skilled workers, it is the major employer. It also plays an integral part of everyday life in terms of subsistence and recreation. Subsistence and recreational fishing are especially important to New Zealanders, with approximately 20% of the population engaging in these activities, and others involved in the growing commercial recreational industry. Finally, the marine environment is integral to New Zealand’s persona, its “green image”. As an island nation, fisheries are an integral part of New Zealand’s history and culture.
Appendix B: Customary Rights

The following description is from the Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission’s website: www.tokm.co.nz

Taiapure

The Maori Fisheries Act (1989) provided a framework which recognised Maori treaty rights to customary (non-commercial) fishing areas within New Zealand’s fisheries waters.

A taiapure is an estuarine or littoral coastal area which is traditionally important to hapu or iwi. A taiapure, once established, can protect these local areas and recognises that tangata whenua have special needs relating to them. The taiapure legislation recognises tino rangatiratanga and allows hapu and iwi to manage their own fisheries.

Securing management of a customary fishing area or taiapure is an involved task. It is not just a matter of hapu and iwi informing the Crown as to where these customary fishing areas are located, but a complex consultative process with other right holders such as commercial fishers, and other interest groups such as recreational fishers, local diving clubs, as well as the Crown agencies involved in fisheries management.

The first step is for a hapu or iwi to notify the Minister of Fisheries, identifying their traditional relationship with the area, its boundaries, species of importance and the impact of the taiapure application on other fisheries users. Once consultation has occurred and the application has been approved by the Minister of Fisheries, a committee of management for each taiapure can be established. The management committee, under the authority of hapu or iwi allows for anyone from the local community to participate in management of the Taiapure.

Taiapure, are just one of the fisheries management tools available to hapu and iwi to use in managing their fisheries. They can work in conjunction with Mahinga mataitai. For example a mataitai can be placed within a taiapure, or next to a marine reserve.

More detailed information on taiapure can be found in the New Zealand Fisheries Act 1996, Part IX, section 174.
Appendix C: Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission: Fact Sheet on the Final Allocation Model, November 2003

The final model covers all the settlement assets and consists of quota, fishing company shares and cash.

IWI ASSETS

1. Approximately half of the settlement assets in the form of all quota and cash will be transferred directly to mandated Iwi organisations.

2. Quota is generally allocated as either inshore or deepwater quota. The formula for inshore quota is based solely on the proportion of an Iwi’s coastline to the total coastline in each quota management area.

3. The formula for deepwater quota is a based on a 25/75 split between an Iwi’s coastline and an Iwi’s population.

4. An exception has been made for the Chathams Islands. A special 200 metre fishing zone around the Chathams has been created for allocation purposes. All inshore quota is allocated to Chathams Islands Iwi. The formula for deepwater is allocated 50 percent to Chatham Island Iwi on the basis of their coastline and 50 percent to all Iwi on the basis of population.

5. Cash is allocated based on the proportion of an Iwi’s population to the overall Maori population.

6. The Iwi who will receive the largest parcel of assets represent a mix of coastal and populous Iwi. They are Ngai Tahu, Ngati Kahungunu, Ngapuhi, Ngati Porou, Chathams Iwi (Moriori and Ngati Mutunga) and Waikato.

7. All Iwi organisations are required to meet minimum governance, structural, representational requirements and coastline entitlements before assets are transferred. Commission staff are currently assisting Iwi through this process. But the final legal requirements may alter during the passage of the Bill.

8. Iwi have a responsibility to ensure that all their descendants will ultimately benefit from the Maori Fisheries Settlement no matter where they reside.

STRUCTURES

9. The allocation model proposes four key organisations to centrally manage assets on behalf of Iwi and Maori to maximise the benefits.

   • A new trust called Te Ohu Kai Moana will have a similar role to the existing Commission and will have an overall governance role for the group.
• Te Putea Whakatupu Trust provides a fund and promotes development for all Maori, particularly those disconnected from their tribal roots, who wish to enter into the business and activity of fishing.

• Te Wai Maori Trust provides a fund to promote freshwater fisheries development.

• Aotearoa Fisheries Limited will consolidate share holdings in the existing Maori-owned companies and it will manage the commercial activities of the group.

10. A new Maori electoral college, called Te Kawai Taumata, made up of Iwi and Maori representatives will elect the Commissioners on Te Ohu Kai Moana Trust.

**COMPANY SHARES**

11. Approximately half of the settlement assets in the form of company shares will be held in a new fishing entity called Aotearoa Fisheries Limited (AFL).

12. AFL will amalgamate the commercial assets held by the Commission. This includes share holdings in Sealord (50 percent), Prepared Foods (50 percent) and 100 percent ownership in Moana Pacific, Chathams Processing, Pacific Marine Farms and Prepared Foods Processing.

13. Each recognised Iwi organisation will be distributed annual dividends from AFL. 80 percent of the income shares will be held by Iwi in proportion to an Iwi’s population with the overall Maori population. The remaining 20 percent will be held by the new trust called Te Ohu Kai Moana.